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ABSTRACT 
Communications is a critical enabling capability that is interwoven into every 
facet of every military operation.  Assessing what communication capability is most 
valuable to the operation is a vital planning requirement [to avoid using the word process 
twice in the same sentence] that currently resides in several processes that produce 
differing outcomes within the DoD.  This thesis examines these planning processes, 
particularly the capability-based approach, assessing which process is optimum for 
determining communication shortfalls.  
An in-depth comparison of the Joint Capabilities Integrated Defense System 
(JCIDS) and USNORTHCOM’s Capability Review and Resource Assessment (CRRA) 
was conducted, examining the respective strengths and weakness of each process.  This 
thesis then recommends an optimized hybrid solution of the CRRA and JCIDS, thus 
providing an intuitive methodology that can be used to model what communication 
capabilities are essential to the DoD and its interagency partners. 
Ultimately, this model may serve to guide the defense planning process to ensure 
meaningful collaboration occurs, when crafting a unified DoD and interagency position 
regarding communications and network-centric capability needs and shortfalls.  Particular 
utility can be applied to fill the gap of interoperable communications solutions between 
first responders, the military, interagency and coalition partners, when teaming in a 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. THESIS ARGUMENT ....................................................................................1 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION ...............................................................................2 
C. APPLICABILITY............................................................................................4 
II. COMMUNICATION SHORTFALLS:  BACKGROUND AND 
FRAMEWORK............................................................................................................7 
A. WHAT CONSTITUTES COMMUNICATIONS? .......................................7 
B. HOW ARE COMMUNICATIONS APPLIED TO HOMELAND 
DEFENSE? .....................................................................................................10 
C. WHAT IS A SHORTFALL AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?................12 
III. DEFENSE PLANNING PART I:  CONNECTING THE DOTS ..........................17 
A. AMERICA’S GRAND STRATEGY............................................................17 
B. AMERICA’S DEFENSE STRATEGY........................................................20 
C. USNORTHCOM’S DEFENSE STRATEGY..............................................23 
IV. DEFENSE PLANNING PART II:  DISCERNING NEEDS..................................27 
A. THE BOGSAT ...............................................................................................27 
B. THREAT-BASED PLANNING AND OTHER CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORKS............................................................................................30 
C. JCIDS..............................................................................................................33 
V. IDENTIFYING COMMUNICATION SHORTFALLS FOR 
USNORTHCOM........................................................................................................37 
A. CURRENT METHODOLOGY....................................................................37 
B. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CURRENT PROCESSES .......39 
C. AN OPTIMZIED PROPOSAL.....................................................................41 
VI. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................49 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS....................49 
B. WHO NEEDS IT?..........................................................................................53 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................55 






























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. JOpsC Family ..................................................................................................34 
Figure 2. The JCIDS Analysis Process ...........................................................................35 





























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. CONPLAN2502-05 Communications Requirements......................................25 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I wish to thank the following individuals for their support and assistance during 
the work of this thesis:  First, to my beautiful wife, Karen, who inspired and encouraged 
me through the long hours of research.  She has been an incredible sounding board as to 
the importance and relevance of this topic.  Second, to my advisors, Professors James 
Russell and Daniel Moran, who took time from their hectic schedules to guide me in 
applying the academic rigor needed to transform my thoughts and passions into a work 
that is suited for an intellectual body.  Third, to Colonel D. J. Johnson and Lieutenant 
Colonel Mike Connelly, my former bosses from the Air Force Space and C4ISR 
CONOPS Division at the Pentagon.  They both allowed me license to create and to think 
out of the box.  Their support and feedback facilitated the genesis of the hybrid 
methodology recommended in this thesis to optimize current capability-based planning 
processes for Homeland Defense.  Fourth, to all the action officers at the Pentagon and at 
USNORTHCOM, who shared with me their frank insight concerning current defense 
planning processes.  Last, but not least, to the U.S. Air Force which for the past 24 years, 
has trained and educated me in the profession of arms.  I will always be grateful to the 
Air Force; the only institution willing to take a risk on a poor, uneducated, but ambitious 
boy from the Ozarks of Missouri and provide him with the opportunity to study, grow, 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THESIS ARGUMENT  
A major shift is occurring within the DoD regarding the development and funding 
of communication requirements for the services.  Transformation from the Cold War, 
coupled with the events of 9/11, have forced the DoD to change its rules of engagement 
when it prioritizes and funds communications systems for the warfighter.  Aging 
platforms and the war in Iraq have further increased competition for funding among the 
services, thus complicating the decision-making process for senior military leaders. 
During the height of the Cold War, when pockets were deep and the adversary 
was a symmetrical actor, funding decisions were reached using the BOGSAT1 (Bunch of 
Guys Sitting at the Table) method.  This method was an exercise in service parochialism 
steeped in emotion and politics, where the highest ranking or most protected leader 
prevailed.  Over time, the BOGSAT system evolved into a more qualitative approach, 
where requirements were validated by linking mission impact to the perspective 
communication system.  However, this approach still lacked the quantitative rigor 
necessary to ascertain an objective analysis. 
In June of 2003, the DoD issued CJCSI 3170.01, Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System (JSIDS), with the intent to migrate from a platform-centric 
procurement process to a capability-centric approach2.  This approach employs a series of 
Joint Functional Concepts (JFCs) to identify critical capabilities that deliver a desired 
effect to the combatant commander.  In the communications arena, the Network-Centric 
Environment (NCE) JFC is utilized to capture communication shortfalls for the DoD.  
The Air Force3 in and Navy4 has since followed suit, by developing their own service-
centric Capability-Based Planning (CBP) process to identify communication shortfalls. 
                                                 
1 Ernest Forman, Decision by Objectives: How to Convince Others that you are Right, 
http://mdm.gwu.edu/forman/DBO.pdf, 6 (August 2007). 
2 Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 3170.01, Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (2003), 1. 
3 U. S.  Air Force Instruction 10-604, Capability Based Planning (2006), 3. 
4 U. S. Navy FORCEnet, What is the Value- Added of FORCEnet, forcenet.navy.mil/fn-
definition.htm (19 November 2006). 
2 
This thesis examines current methodologies used in the DoD to ascertain 
communication and network-centric capability shortfalls for warfighters and first 
responders.  The objective is to develop an intuitive and meaningful methodology that 
defense planners and programmers can adopt to discern communication shortfalls, 
quantify and articulate those shortfalls, and then, in turn, use that data to help decision 
makers prioritize funds when procuring systems that provide communication capabilities 
for Homeland Defense. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The key research question analyzed is:  Does CBP possess the right methodology 
to assist defense planners and programmers in determining capability gaps/shortfalls?  
The following sub-questions provide further granularity and analysis of the research 
problem: 
• How can the CBP process be more intuitive? 
• How does CBP determine capability gaps? 
• How does the output of CBP provide meaningful data for decision makers 
to prioritize procurement funds?  What is this data? 
• How can CBP be improved to better determine communication shortfalls? 
Little is published regarding CBP.  This is a new discipline within the DoD that is 
gaining momentum, but is not well documented.  Two sectors studied provide the 
framework of existing knowledge for CBP: Needs Determination Planning in the 
corporate sector and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System for the 
DoD.5 
Though the Needs Determination Planning process provides utility in the 
corporate world, it is nearly identical to the traditional procurement process used for 
                                                 
5 Thus far, a significant amount of work has been done within the Air Force as a stand-alone service, 
namely the Capability Risk and Review Assessment (CRRA).  Unfortunately, the Air Force has not yet 
bridged the gap that exists as a component to the Combatant Commander (COCOM) concerning 
communications or Network-Centric Environment CBP methodology.  Considering this, the focus of this 
thesis will be to develop the correct methodology the defense planner and programmers can use to gather 
shortfalls for the COCOM, more precisely, USNORTHCOM, with respect to Homeland Defense and First-
Responder support. 
3 
years by the services. This process involved units submitting their requirements to their 
respective headquarters, after which panels were formed to rack and stack these 
requirements.6  Then, the board or panels would ultimately decide or not decide to fund 
them.  Years of executing this process often revealed that a less than optimum solution 
was procured and left the operator lacking the needed capability to accomplish the 
mission.  This occurred because capability effectiveness was not measured or evaluated.  
Systems or platforms were procured based on requirement documents without any 
evaluation of capability analysis performed.7 
In relation to the DoD sector, available literature includes DoD instructions and 
Joint Functional Concepts.  There is no text book to assist planners on the art of CBP 
methodology or processes.  The DoD instruction describes a capability assessment used 
by Combatant Commands, known as Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System.  Currently, several methodologies exist in the DoD and each one differs in their 
application and execution.  Each directorate of the Joint Staff employs its own unique 
Joint Functional Concept.  Nearly every concept discusses communications, but each 
concept differs in articulating and quantifying what a capability is and how to measure its 
effectiveness.8 
Existing literature falls short of addressing the NORTHCOM problem of planning 
and funding communication capabilities for Homeland Defense.  Exhaustive research 
revealed that no literature exists in the corporate sector that addresses CBP.  Current 
literature regarding the corporate sector pertains to strategic planning, but does not 
address a capabilities based approach.  The DoD instruction provides over-arching 
                                                 
6 The corporate sector does not use CBP per se.  However, according to Dr. Ron Schill, MBA 
Professor at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, a method known as Need Determination 
Planning is used in industry, which is akin to CBP, incorporating similar processes.  Ron Schill, Ph. D, is a 
visiting Professor, Fisher Graduate School of International Business, Monterey Institute of International 
Studies.  He is a professor emeritus from the Marriot School of Business at Brigham Young University, 
with over 30 years of teaching and research devoted to strategic planning and marketing.   Interviewed by 
Kevin Wilson.  (2006). 
7 U. S.  Air Force Instruction 10-604. 
8 Mike Connelly, Lieutenant Colonel, Deputy Director, Space and C4ISR Concept of Operations, 
AF/A5XC-SC, Pentagon, Washington, DC. Interview by Kevin Wilson. (2006).  See also, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Functional Concept.  Battle Space Awareness.  Washington DC. 2003, Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Functional Concept.  Joint Command and Control.  Washington DC. 2005, 
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Functional Concept.  Net-Centric Environment.  
Washington DC. 2005. 
4 
guidance of the capability planning process, but lacks specified direction to ascertain 
communication capability shortfalls.  The JFC provides a very technical approach to 
discern capability shortfalls, but does not address specific capabilities for war fighters or 
first responders working in a collaborative environment in an inter-agency, federal, state, 
or local setting.9 
This research originated from mainly primary sources, as secondary sources are 
scarce.  The primary sources consist of raw data and methodology developed at the 
Pentagon, coupled with interviews from DoD subject matter experts.  
The study of this problem will involve a careful review and re-evaluation of 
existing DoD and Air Force CBP processes.  It will also entail primary source interviews 
of Pentagon and NORTHCOM planners with the possibility of onsite visits for test 
scoring purposes.  This feedback and mock data will enable the development of a new 
process to find existing communication and network-centric capability gaps for 
warfighters and first responders working in a collaborative environment. 
C. APPLICABILITY 
This research is intended to provide alternative methods for Combatant 
Commands, primarily USNORTHCOM, to plan and fund communication capabilities for 
Homeland Defense.  US Joint Forces Command may also find value in this process and 
use it as a template across the DoD and Joint Staff. 
Further, this thesis will stress the importance of collaboration among the 
COCOM, Joint Staff, and services when planning, staffing and executing the Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM) during and between Future Years Defense Program 
(FYDP).  
 
                                                 
9 Mike Connelly, Lieutenant Colonel, Deputy Director, Space and C4ISR Concept of Operations, 
AF/A5XC-SC, Pentagon, Washington, DC. Interview by Kevin Wilson. (2006).  See also, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Functional Concept.  Battle Space Awareness.  Washington DC. 2003, Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Functional Concept.  Joint Command and Control.  Washington DC. 2005, 
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Functional Concept.  Net-Centric Environment.  
Washington DC. 2005. 
5 
This is a critical element of defense planning since precious resources are often 
wasted as the result of poor collaboration and non-standard processes occurring 
simultaneously which fail to capture a unified DoD position when articulating capability 
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II. COMMUNICATION SHORTFALLS:  BACKGROUND AND 
FRAMEWORK 
A. WHAT CONSTITUTES COMMUNICATIONS? 
The world is now at the height of an information revolution where the 
dissemination and analysis of data is critical to government, commerce, and world 
culture.  From a national defense perspective, communications is an enabling capability 
that is interwoven into every facet of military operations.  The term “communications” is 
often interchanged with concepts such as:  the Network-Centric Environment and C4 
(Command, Control, Communications, and Computers).10  This is mainly due to the 
evolvement of electronic technology with the advancement of electrical component 
miniaturization, as well as that of computers, computer software, and its internet-worked 
architectures. 
During World War II and through the Cold War, the term communications 
represented a category of technology such as:  radio, radar, telephone, telegraph, and 
teletype.  By the 1960’s satellite communications were introduced to the DoD11, which 
provided an optimized voice or telephony12 capability to the warfighter, and ushered in 
space-based communication technology. 
An important step occurred in 1969, when the University of California at Los 
Angeles installed the first Advanced Research Projects Agency node13, sharing digital 
packet information with the Stanford Research Institute, the University of California at 
Santa Barbara, and the University of Utah.14  This birth of the Internet further shaped 
military communications as it merged traditional communications, such as radio, video, 
                                                 
10 The Joint Chief of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, A Strategy 
for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow, 2004, 19, 27. 
11 Committee on Evolution of Untethered Communications, Computer Science and 
Telecommunications Board, Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications National 
Research Council, The Evolution of Untethered Communications, National Academy Press:  Washington, 
DC, 1997, 1.2.5.  
12 The JCS Glossary of Communications-Electronics Terms defines telephony/voice as:  A form of 
telecommunication primarily intended for the exchange of information in the form of speech. 
13 Ibid:  A point of interconnection to a network; One of the switches forming the network’s backbone. 
14 The Evolution of Untethered Communication, 1.2.7. 
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and telephony services, with computer technology.  This synergy became known as 
network-centric, as these services can now be integrated and transported over networks 
and shared with multiple users. 
The Network-Centric Environment is defined as:  “a framework for full human 
and technical connectivity and interoperability that allows all DoD users and mission 
partners to share the information they need, when they need it, in a form they can 
understand and act on with confidence, and protects information from those who should 
not have it.”15 
Several of these terms require further definition.  First, the concept technical 
connectivity implies equipment or hardware that is connected or interconnected together.  
Second, interoperability can be defined as:  “The ability of systems, units or forces to 
provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the 
services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”16  Third, 
information is:  “Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form with context that is 
comprehensible to the user.”17  Finally, “all DoD users and mission partners” refer to all 
branches of the services working with interagency partners, such as the intelligence 
community, the Department of Homeland Defense, the State Department, the Department 
of Justice, and etc.  Needless to say, many of the challenges in the communications area, 
from ad DoD perspective, arise from the dramatic recent expansion of who its “mission 
partners” might be under given circumstances, and the need to develop systems that can 
take account of their requirements in a timely manner. 
Simply put, communications, C4, the network-centric environment, or net-
centricity, might be best understood in the context of homeland defense as:  Connectivity 
and interoperability that allows all DOD users and mission partners to include: Joint,  
 
 
                                                 
15 The Department of Defense, Joint Functional Concept, Network-centric Environment, 7 April 2005, 
1. 
16 The Combined Communications-Electronics Board, Glossary of Communications-Electronics 
Terms, ACP 167(I), March 2005, 2-88 
 17 Joint Functional Concept, Network-Centric Environment.  B-2. 
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Coalition, and Inter-Agency users to share information when they need it, in a form they 
can understand and act on with confidence, and which also protects information from 
those who should not have it. 
Now that a working definition of communications has been established, it is 
important to examine the components, or functions, that make up the repository of 
communications or net-centricity.  Three categories provide a valuable framework for 
this discussion.18  They are:  voice, video, and data.  The following definitions depict 
these categories: 
• Voice - Provide information via [human or computerized] voice to include: radio, 
phone, interphone, voice-over IP, or public address system.19  Or, the frequency of an 
acoustic oscillation which may be produced by the normal human voice.20  For 
further clarity, interphone is defined as:  A telephone apparatus by means of which 
personnel can talk to each other within an aircraft, tank, ship or activity.21  Voice 
systems are typically found in radios that reside in aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, 
and portable backpacks versions. 
• Video - Information such as: streaming video, video teleconferencing, live 
transmissions, or recorded video.22  Video is the images captured by camera and 
displayed via various types of displays such as:  a computer, television, cell phone, 
multi-function displays in aircraft, ships, our ground vehicles.  In a collaborative 
setting, video is captured via a web camera or cellular phone and shared over the 
internet or cellular network as raw data or during chat sessions.   
• Data - Text or imagery such as: digitized photos, forms/publications, email, 
messages, web pages, chat sessions, or audio files.23  This data is created by manual 
input such as a keyboard, stylus, digital camera, or scanner.  The data is disseminated 
manually by humans or automatically by machine, network, or internet processes. 
                                                 
18 U.S. Air Force, Master Capabilities Library, Net-Centricity, version 6.0, 2007. 
19 Ibid. 
20 ACP(I) 167, 2-171. 
21 Ibid., 2-88. 
22 Master Capabilities Library, Net-Centricity. 
23 Ibid. 
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B. HOW ARE COMMUNICATIONS APPLIED TO HOMELAND DEFENSE? 
As Section A defined the basics of communication capabilities, this section will 
depict how basic capabilities are used in a homeland defense environment.  
Communications applied to the defense arena, specifically applied to homeland defense, 
become more complex and advanced.  In addition to enabling C4 functions, 
communications enable space, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
functions.24  Space and C4ISR platforms are extremely network-centric.  They are a 
system of systems interconnected via networks to collect, process, and disseminate data.  
Further, Space and C4ISR platforms typically integrate the three categories of 
communication capability defined in section A, namely:  voice, video, and data.  For 
example, a Defense System Communication Satellite III is capable of sending voice, 
video, and data worldwide to a variety of military and government users.  The satellite 
itself orbits in space at an altitude of 22,000 miles, but is controlled by a series of ground 
stations that are interconnected by network-centric technology.  Users on the ground, at 
sea, or in air can access this system to receive and disseminate data to conduct 
operations.25 
In addition to disseminating data, imagery and infrared sensors reside on defense 
satellites providing valuable ISR for homeland defense.  Infrared sensors on the Defense 
Support Program Satellite, provides early warning detection of missile launches against 
the United States or personnel operating overseas.  Again, this is a high orbiting satellite 
that is controlled by ground stations that are interconnected by network-centric capability 
and the information is processed, analyzed, and disseminated by similar technology.26 
The next important facet of these capabilities is the integration of these various 
sensors, signals, and raw data.  What is critical for the DoD and its interagency partners is 
the sharing of these systems to make intelligible decisions.  This is often called decision-
quality information derived from sensor integration or decision superiority.27 The newly 
                                                 
24 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005, 3. 
25 U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet, Defense System Communication Satellite.  
http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=95&page=1, (Accessed 5 April 2007). 
26 Ibid.  http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=96, (Accessed 5 April 2007). 
27 Joint Functional Concepts, Battle Space Awareness, 15 and Net-Centric Environment, 6. 
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published Joint Operating Concept for Homeland Defense and Civil Support provides an 
excellent explanation of this concept, discussed in the Battlespace Awareness section of 
the document:  “Battlespace awareness is the ability of the Joint Force Commander to 
understand the operational environment, the full array of interagency and international 
capabilities, and the adversary.  To ensure DOD can detect, deter, prevent, or if necessary 
defeat threats to the Homeland and assist in mitigating the effects of attacks that do occur, 
the Joint Force Commander must have a comprehensive understanding of the battlespace 
(within the limits set by law).  This includes the capability to detect the full range of 
threats enabled through an interlocking field of sensors with deep reach and remote 
surveillance capability, fused with national-level intelligence collection and analysis to 
provide common situational awareness across the spectrum of participants for all 
domains in the operating environment (air, space, land, maritime, and cyber).  For HD 
and CS, this includes shared awareness (including non-intelligence sources) between 
numerous government and non-government participants.”28 
In addition to the interlocking or integrating a field of sensors and the fusing of 
national level intelligence discussed here, an underpinning of information sharing is 
essential to decision or information superiority.  This implies technical solutions, as well 
as a profound alteration of the culture of sharing information that has traditionally existed 
within the intelligence community, the DoD, and its likely coalition or interagency 
partners.  This is perhaps the most difficult barrier to overcome since it involves the 
human element of how operations are conducted.  This can be overcome by fostering a 
spirit of openness and sharing.  This concept is described in the net-centric JFC as end-to-
end transparency.  This is a concept of opening up technical and cultural barriers, thus 
providing information to those who need it and is defined as:  visible, accessible, 
understandable, verifiable, current, and trusted.29 
A final important communication concept applied to homeland defense is the 
advent of wireless technology.  Wireless solutions provide homeland defense personnel 
with portable, lightweight, and secure capability which allows for the collection, analysis, 
                                                 
28 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Operating Concept, Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support, Washington DC, September 2006, 51. 
29 Joint functional Concept, Net-Centric Environment, 16. 
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and dissemination of information.30  This is an important aspect since these personnel 
may deploy, in an austere or a ravaged environment where fixed infrastructure is not 
available or has been damaged by an attack or natural disaster.  This technology provides 
an agility factor for personnel who must deploy with little or short notice and have 
limited space and weight allowances to transport large amounts of equipment and 
personnel to operate it. 
A few of these devices may include:  personal digital assistants, cellular 
telephones, laptop or knee board computers, hand held radios, global positioning service 
receivers, and a myriad of wireless sensors to collect and disseminate vital imagery, 
weather,  and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) data. 
Wireless technology provides interconnectivity from the sensor to the decider to 
the shooter and or responder.  It provides a push pull collaborative ability between these 
entities, facilitating centralized decision making with decentralized execution.  An 
effective wireless solution has the ability to integrate the three components of 
communications, voice, video, and data, in a seamless manner to those individuals who 
require and are authorized access to the information. 
An area of technology that is bringing wireless technology to fruition is the 
development and fielding of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).  UAVs are able to collect 
various ISR information, such as:  voice, video, data, weather, radar, and CBRNE, and 
disseminate it back to distribute ground systems for processing and analysis.  This 
information can then be pushed or pulled to various personnel who may need it to 
conduct homeland defense missions in virtually any environment, in the air, on land or 
sea, or from space. 
C. WHAT IS A SHORTFALL AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT? 
Before shortfalls can be discussed, it is essential to understand what a capability 
is.  Capabilities are often confused with systems, platforms, tasks, or effects.  The joint 
staff defines capability as:  “The ability to execute a specified course of action. It is 
defined by an operational user and expressed in broad operational terms in the format of 
                                                 
30 Defense Information Agency, FY 2004/2005 Budget Estimate, Research, Development, Test, and 
Engineering Budget Item Justifications, February 2003.  
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an initial capabilities document or a DOTMLPF change recommendation. In the case of 
material proposals, the definition will progressively evolve to DOTMLPF performance 
attributes identified in the CDD and the CPD.”31 
Though a system or platform delivers capability and provides effects, it is not a 
capability in itself.  Computer networks and handheld radios are systems or solutions, not 
capabilities.  They provide capabilities such as, wireless voice and data services to the 
operator, but are not capabilities by themselves. 
Nor should capabilities be confused with tasks.  Regarding communications and 
NCE capabilities, the capability may be: provide voice communications on the ground, 
air, or sea, and not install VHF radios, antennas, and cabling in ground facilities. The 
capability is the what, not the how or why.  Capabilities are produced by systems and 
platforms and contribute the desired effect, but are not stand-alone systems, platforms, or 
effects. 
As capability has been defined, shortfalls and gaps must be understood.  In the 
capabilities planning arena, gaps and shortfalls are used interchangeably.  The joint 
community explains capability gap(s) as:  “The capabilities are identified by analyzing 
what is required across all functional areas to accomplish the mission. The gaps or 
redundancies are then identified by comparing the capability needs to the capabilities 
provided by existing or planned systems.”32  The inability to provide those needs results 
in a capability gap or shortfall. 
This often tedious process requires that available integrated architectures be 
analyzed and compared to the combatant commands Integrated Priority Listing.  The IPL 
is the operational requirement stated by the combatant command and is often non-
descriptive.  The challenge is matching these non-descriptive requirements to existing or 
future systems that may or not provide the needed capability.  Another challenge to be 
mindful of is that integrated architectures are not systems, but:  “An architecture 
                                                 
31 Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 3170.01, Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (2003), GL-4.  DOTMLPF is defined as:  doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities; CDD is defined as:  capability development document; 
and CPD is defined as:  capability production document. 
32 Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Manual 3170.01B, Operation of the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (11 May 2005), GL-10. 
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consisting of multiple views or perspectives (operational view, systems view and 
technical standards view) that facilitates integration and promotes interoperability across 
capabilities and among related integrated architectures.”33  What planners must do during 
this process is to establish the linkages between architectures and systems. 
In the context of NCE, information support plans aid the process by establishing 
these linkages by describing:  “system dependencies and interface requirements in 
sufficient detail to enable testing and verification of information technology (IT) and 
National Security Systems (NSS) interoperability and supportability requirements. The 
ISP shall also include IT and NSS systems interface descriptions, infrastructure and 
support requirements, standards profiles, measures of performance and interoperability 
shortfalls.”34  This is important, because NCE is an enabling capability that underpins all 
military operations.  Therefore, system dependencies, interface requirements, and 
interoperability must be in constant consideration. 
What is the importance of communication gap analysis?  Aside from merely 
heightening everyone’s awareness that communications are the enabling capability of 
most military/civil operations, its real utility comes from how it affects the decision 
maker who allocates funds.  The catch phrase often heard at the Pentagon by senior 
officers and executives is: “If I had one more dollar to spend, where should it go?”  Gap 
analysis helps answer this question by inserting several decision points into the 
acquisition process that forces the decision maker to assess how capability gaps are 
maturing and where to direct resources to close these gaps.  If the maturity process is 
going poorly, flag officers and senior executive may decide to stop funding to a particular 
program and divert funds where more progress is being made.  
If the shortfall is validated correctly, in the context of meticulous capability-based 
planning, a common thread or traceability may be established throughout a myriad of 
operations.  For example, if it is determined that a data shortfall has been identified and it 
                                                 
33 Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Manual 3170.01B, Operation of the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System, (11 May 2005), GL-9. 
34 Ibid., GL-8. 
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is occurring across several joint capability areas35, such as:  land, sea, space, and defense 
support of civil authority operations, this implies the criticality of this particular shortfall.  
This provides decision makers an integrated analysis to consider what is more rigorous 
and objective than traditional procurement processes.  This provides combatant 
commanders’ shortfalls to present that have been validated in a joint environment across 
several types of operations, thus lending to the credibility of the funding decision. 
Though some capability-based planning methodology has been discussed here to 
aid the discussion of communication shortfall/gap analysis, a more thorough discussion is 























                                                 
35 The Joint Staff provides two definitions for Joint Capability Areas (JCAs):  1. An integral part of 
the evolving Capabilities-Based Planning process…the beginnings of a common language to discuss and 
describe capabilities across many related Department activities and processes, (SECDEF Memo, 6 May 
2005).  2.  JCAs are collections of capabilities grouped to support capability analysis, strategy 
development, investment decision making, capability portfolio management, and capabilities-based force 
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III. DEFENSE PLANNING PART I:  CONNECTING THE DOTS 
A. AMERICA’S GRAND STRATEGY 
Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1984, every president has been 
required to issue an annual statement called the National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America.  These documents represent, by definition, the most senior national 
defense guidance that exists at any given moment.  They are also, by nature, so general in 
their application, and so broad in scope, that their practical application to real-world 
defense planning is inevitably open to question.   
Planners and programmers of the capabilities-based persuasion in particular are 
inclined to question the value of attempting to establish concrete linkages between such 
high-level policy and the process of procuring capabilities, which, once procured, are by 
nature much less easy to change than whatever strategic language may have inspired their 
acquisition in the first place.  Nevertheless, politics also has its practical realities, no less 
than the procurement process does, and it is a fact that when budgets leave the Pentagon 
or Congress, and are awaiting signature at the White House, programs that provide 
capabilities for homeland defense (or any other military mission) stand a better chance of 
survival if there is a legitimate linkage to the National Security Strategy. 
Therefore, the first step is to identify objectives from this strategy that would 
require the enabling capability of communications or network-centricity.  The March 
2006 strategy contains nine objectives to help secure America.  Of these nine, seven can 
be legitimately linked to communications or network-centric capabilities provided by the 
military.  Consequently, the remaining section of this chapter will elaborate on these 
seven objectives and link the type of communication capabilities that might enable these 
objectives with respect to homeland defense. 
The first objective, Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity, is a rather 
intangible objective as it speaks to ending tyranny and spreading democracy.  However, 
pertaining to the third element of the “Way Ahead” section of this objective titled: “How 
We Will Advance Freedom:  Principled in Goals and in Pragmatic in Means,” a linkage is 
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found.36  Here the following tool is discussed:  “Tailoring assistance and training of 
military forces to support civilian control of the military and military respect for human 
rights in a democratic society.”37  This concept is deeply steeped in homeland defense 
with regards to civil support provided by the military.  It implies a full spectrum of 
communications capabilities that enable operations occurring in collaborative 
environments between the military, interagency, federal, state, and local partners such as: 
natural disasters, humanitarian efforts, or attacks on the homeland. 
The second objective of the national security strategy called:  “Strengthen 
Alliance to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our 
Friends.”38  This objective calls out two elements tied to communication capabilities.  
The first element: “Prevent attacks by terrorist networks before they occur”, requires a 
find, fix, target, track, engage, and assess model to disrupt, capture, and or kill terrorists.  
Communication capabilities which enable this to occur are in the sensor-to-shooter 
integration and in the collection and dissemination of intelligence, primarily in the human 
and communications intelligence genre.39  The second element: “Deny WMD to rogue 
states and to terrorist allies who would use them without hesitation”, involves the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of CBRNE weapon proliferation intelligence.40  
Sensor-to-shooter integration, coupled with interoperable network connectivity for 
homeland defenders and the intelligence community, brings this objective to fruition. 
Linkage three is contained in the objective:  “Work with Others to Defuse 
Regional Conflicts.”41  This objective discusses the need for the U.S. to work with 
coalition and foreign governments for conflict intervention and post conflict stabilization 
and reconstruction.  Interoperable network-centric communications and intelligence 
sharing is essential to meet the intent of this objective. 
                                                 
36 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, 2-6. 
37 Ibid., 6. 
38 Ibid., 8. 
39 Ibid., 12. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 16. 
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The fourth association is embodied in the requirement to:  “Prevent Our Enemies 
from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction.”42  
This objective is closely related to the second linkage as it utilizes the same 
communications capabilities for WMD and CBRNE.  However, this objective introduces 
missile defense and pathogen detection.  The U.S. Missile Defense System is a 
space/ground based defensive and offensive system highly reliant on network-centric 
technology to find, fix, target, track, engage, and assess incoming missiles bound for the 
homeland.  It employs sensor-to-shooter integration and relies on a highly robust and 
sophisticated command and control structure.  This objective also describes new 
offensive nuclear and conventional strike capabilities, which would require shooter-to-
shooter integration and enhanced nuclear command and control capabilities. 
Objective five: “Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with Other Main 
Centers of Global Power”, captures the need for joining with other nations and the 
transformation of NATO to stabilize international security vulnerabilities.43  
Interoperable network-centric systems, collaborative tools, and intelligence sharing is 
necessary for this objective to take root. 
The sixth objective: “Transform America’s National Security Institutions to Meet 
the Challenges and Opportunities of the 21st Century”, is a national security objective 
which is extremely reliant on automation.44  Transformation which really equates to over 
two decades of doing more with less and the constant downsizing of the military 
necessitates the military to rely on network-centricity and information dominance to 
enhance operations in the coalition, joint, and interagency environment. 
The seventh and final objective that is linked to communication capabilities is: 
“Engage the Opportunities and Confront the Challenges of Globalization”. This addresses 
public health challenges like  pandemics and cataclysmic events which tax first-responder 
support.45  Again, intelligence and information sharing, interoperable networks, and 
wireless technologies enable the accomplishment of this objective. 
                                                 
42 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, 18. 
43 Ibid., 35. 
44 Ibid., 43. 
45 Ibid., 47. 
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B. AMERICA’S DEFENSE STRATEGY 
The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America is the Department 
of Defense’s plan to align its objective against America’s grand strategy.  Published in 
March 2005, it was better aligned with the White House’s National Security Strategy of 
September 2002.  Nonetheless, similarities reside in the two documents and the Pentagon 
has made the connection in the strategic objectives, implementation guidelines, and in the 
desired capabilities and attributes section of the document. 
Primarily, America’s defense strategy speaks of building on the 2001 Quadrennial 
Defense Review by implementing transformation via a capabilities approach.  Four 
strategic objectives have been established which link fairly well to the grand strategy.  
They are:  “secure the United States from direct attack; secure strategic access and retain 
global freedom of action; strengthen alliances and partnerships and establish favorable 
security conditions.” 46  These four objectives would require the same type of enabling 
communication capability as were linked to America’s National Security Strategy, 
namely voice, video, and data used in the air, land, sea, and space domains.  Further, the 
same attributes would also apply, such as:  interoperability and multi-level security. 
Multi-level security speaks to information sharing amongst mission partners who have a 
need to know.  These partners may exist as:  foreign governments/coalition partners; 
interagency partners; federal, state, local, and tribal governments; and joint military 
organizations.  Though attributes will be discussed in great detail in chapter five of this 
thesis, it is important to introduce this concept, as this strategy is steeped in a capabilities 
based approach. 
As stated in this strategy:  “Capabilities-based planning focuses more on how 
adversaries may challenge us than on whom those adversaries might be or where we 
might face them. It focuses the Department on the growing range of capabilities and 
methods we must possess to contend with an uncertain future. It recognizes the limits of 
intelligence and the impossibility of predicting complex events with precision.  Our 
planning aims to link capabilities to joint operating concepts across a broad range of 
                                                 
46 The Department of Defense, the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 
2005, iv. 
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scenarios.”47  It can be argued that this is one of the key elements used to transform the 
military, shifting focus from a threat-based planning model to the capability-based model. 
This document goes on to introduce the Defense Department’s desired capabilities 
and attributes.  There are eight of them.  They are:48 
1. Strengthen Intelligence 
2. Protecting Critical Bases of Operation 
3. Operating from the Global Commons 
4. Protecting and Sustaining Forces in Distance Anti-Access Environments 
5. Denying Enemies Sanctuary 
6. Conducting Network-Centric Operations 
7. Improving Proficiency Against Irregular Challenges 
8. Increase Capabilities of Partner-International and Domestic 
This is where this document begins to unravel.  These eight items do not meet the 
criteria of defined capabilities per the guidance from the Joints Chiefs of Staff.  Per their 
guidance, the J7 has identified and grouped operational capabilities into tiers, thus 
prioritizing and establishing a common language amongst the joint community.  For 
example, the J7 has a few of the following as core capability areas:49 
• Joint Land Operations 
• Joint Maritime/Littoral Operations 
• Joint Air Operations 
• Joint Space Operations 
• Joint Access & Access Denial Operations 
• Joint Information Operations 
The difference between the two lists is apparent.  The first is a list of objectives or 
tasks, whereas the latter are distinct capability areas employed by the military.  Hence, 
this is where the confusion begins in the planning and programming communities.  It 
incites the community to lean back towards their comfort zone and think in terms of 
requirements, task, systems, and platforms. 
                                                 
47 The Department of Defense, the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 
2005, 11. 
48 Ibid., 12-15 
49 The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Capability Areas 101, J7/JETCD, April 2007, 6. 
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The other document that is responsible for defining national defense strategy is 
the National Military Strategy of the United States of America.  This document is 
intended to bridge the gap between the White House and the SECDEF strategies.  Signed 
in 2004 by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers, it 
focuses on capabilities and attributes.  They are:50 
• Applying Force 
• Deploying and Sustaining Military Capabilities 
• Securing Battlespace 
• Achieving Decision Superiority 
Like the National Defense Strategy, these four capabilities do not meet the criteria 
as defined by the J7 as capability areas.  Again, these four items are more objectives or 
tasks.  Another problem with the defense strategy is how attributes are defined.  In the 
National Defense Strategy of 2005, two attributes are identified:  shape and size of 
military forces and global defense posture.51  These are not attributes, because they 
cannot be measured.  However, in the National Military Strategy, the following joint 
force attributes are listed:52 





• Decision superiority 
• Lethality 
These attributes are more readily measurable, often associated with a unit of 
measure such as a percentage.  Therefore, work remains to refine these documents to 
establish a common language in the planning community. 
 
                                                 
50 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United Sates of America, A Strategy 
for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow, 2004, 16-19. 
51 The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 16-19. 
52 The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 15. 
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C. USNORTHCOM’S DEFENSE STRATEGY 
The next linkage that requires analysis is how USNORTHCOM implements grand 
and defense strategy.  NORTHCOM’s strategy is derived from the 1 December 2006 
document titled, Strategic Guidance, Defending Our Homeland.  Though this document 
does not mention America’s security, defense, or military strategies, a linkage can be 
found in the dilation of its strategic goals and objectives.  The intent of this document is 
to: “provide strategic direction to ensure unity of effort within and between NORAD and 
USNORTHCOM.”53 
NORAD and NORTHCOM are collocated in Building 2 at Peterson Air Force 
Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado, staffed with over 1,400 Army, Navy, Air Force, 
Marine Corps, Coast Guard, civilian and Canadian personnel.  These two commands 
have complementary missions to secure the North America.  The following mission 
statements depict these complementary roles: 
NORAD Mission Statement 
• Detect, validate, characterize, assess and warn of attacks against North 
America whether by aircraft, missiles or space vehicles. Detect and respond to 
unauthorized and unwanted air activity approaching or operating within North 
American airspace. Process, assess and disseminate intelligence/information 
to warn of maritime threats or attacks against North America. 54 
USNORTHCOM Mission Statement 
• Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed 
at the United States, its territories and interests within the assigned area of 
responsibility; and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, 
provide defense support of civil authorities including consequence 
management operations. 55 
                                                 
53 NORAD/USNORTHCOM, Strategic Guidance - Defending Our Homeland, 1 December 2006, 1. 
54 Ibid., 3 
55 Ibid. 
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Simply, NORAD’s responsibilities remained unchanged prior to 9-11 whereas 
NORTHCOM was established to handle the interagency and military/civil relations issue. 
These complementary roles can be further articulated and the nuances detected in 
the two commands by the following strategic goals: 
NORAD’s Strategic Goals56 
1. Detect, deter, and defend against aerospace threats to North America 
2. Provide timely, accurate maritime warning of threats to, and attacks against 
North America 
3. Be a model for international cooperation in defense planning, execution, 
training, information management and technological innovation 
USNORTHCOM’s Strategic Goals57 
1. Detect, deter, prevent, and defeat external threats and aggression 
2. Provide timely and effective defense support of civil authorities 
3. Improve unity of effort with our interagency and international partners 
Combined Strategic Goal 
• Create a more agile organization that takes care of its people and meets the 
challenges of the 21st Century58 
Though this organization appears redundant, it is solidified by one commander, 
who is dual-hatted to lead both commands.  A similar model to what was used 
when]USSPACECOM and NORAD were led by one four-star flag officer from the 
1980’s through 2002.  In October 2002, USSPACECOM was disbanded, with the Space 
and C4ISR roles transferred to USSTRATCOM. 
This is not to say that NORAD and USNORTHCOM have relegated all Space and 
C4ISR oversight to USSTRATCOM.  On the contrary, the very nature of securing 
America via NORAD and NORTHCOM is completely reliant on Space and C4ISR 
capabilities.  In reality, what is occurring is a division of labor to divvy up this 
                                                 
56 NORAD/USNORTHCOM, Strategic Guidance - Defending Our Homeland, 1 December 2006, 5-6. 
57 Ibid., 7-8 
58 Ibid., 9. 
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tremendous workload associated with planning, programming, and executing the types of 
capabilities and assets required to support the above strategic objectives. 
Further dilation of NORAD’s/NORTHCOM strategic guidance is derived from 
NORTHCOM’s Concept of Operation Plan (CONPLAN) 2501-05.  This 555 page 
CONPLAN, published in April 2006, was created to fulfill the following requirement: 
“USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05 fulfills a requirement established in the Joint 
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) 02 Change 1, Regional Tasking 9. The 
CDRUSNORTHCOM was directed to prepare a plan to support the employment of DOD 
forces providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) IAW applicable DOD 
directives and policy.”59 
This plan was crafted to help bridge the gap from strategic guidance to actionable 
tasks of securing the homeland.  It contains 10 annexes which call out specific actions to 
meet the commander’s intent.  Of the 10 annexes, seven invoke communications or NCE 
capabilities.  The following table links some of the more critical communication/NCE 
capabilities to the applicable annex: 
Table 1.   CONPLAN2502-05 Communications Requirements 
 
                                                 
59 CDRUSNORTHCOM, USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 
11April 2006, i. 
Annex Communications/NCE Requirement 
A – Task Organization National Imagery Collection and Analysis 
B– Intelligence Interagency Data Sharing (CIA/NSA/DIA) 
C – Operations Common Operating Picture Generation 
K – C4 Satellite Communications/Wireless 
Q – Health Services CBRNE Detection and Processing 
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What is significant about this table is that it can act as a point of origin for the 
methodology of the CBP process, particularly when developing models to capture 
shortfalls.  An expanded version of this table will be introduced in Chapter V. 
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IV. DEFENSE PLANNING PART II:  DISCERNING NEEDS 
A. THE BOGSAT 
As briefly discussed in the introduction of this thesis, the BOGSAT, a Bunch of 
Guys Sitting Around the Table method, is evolving towards a more quantitative method.  
Though efforts have occurred to change this paradigm, namely by instituting threat-based 
planning during the Cold War period and introducing CBP post Cold War, the BOGSAT 
paradigm is hard to kill.  It continues to emerge in most corners of government, including 
the DoD, especially pertaining to areas of homeland defense. 
A book authored by Ernest Forman, Professor of Management Science at George 
Washington University, discusses the pitfalls of the BOGSAT process.  Here he iterates 
that the BOGSAT is the most frequently-used decision method in use today.  Further he 
states, “Even though there may be considerable preparation for a BOGSAT, including 
information-gathering, and detailed analyses (e.g., financial, marketing, technical, 
political, etc.,), there are numerous problems with this approach. According to Peter 
Beck, ‘These sessions are often dominated by the leader and rarely facilitated. The leader 
sets the tone and is often not challenged. If the group starts down the wrong path they 
rarely look back.’…However, times are changing and many organizations have been 
abandoning the BOGSAT in favor of more capable methods.”60 
Forman continues to reveal the central problem of the BOGSAT as the cognitive 
limitations of the human brain.  Competent decision making requires following these 
subsequent steps:61 
1. Perfectly defining the problem 
2. Knowing all relevant information 
3. Identifying all criteria 
4. Accurately weighting all the criteria according to his/her goals. 
5. Accurately accessing each alternative on each criterion. 
6. Accurately calculating and choosing the alternative with the highest value. 
                                                 
60 Forman, 5. 
61 Ibid., 6. 
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Also, the BOGSAT require the following to be relevant process: “A BOGSAT 
discussion typically involves dozens of ‘things’, e.g., issues, alternatives, pros, cons, 
objectives, criteria, etc.”62  Simply, most humans are not trained and/or conditioned to 
follow this mental checklist to ensure their decision making is sound.  When the decision 
process grows too complex or stressful, humans will default to using their gut instincts or 
migrate toward the comfort zone of their emotional biases.  Often, as a built-in coping 
mechanism, humans will attempt to simplify or de-scope the problem in order to 
comprehend it or find a low hanging fruit solution to rectify the problem.  This is 
problematic as this simplifying or de-scoping often indeed changes the nature of the 
problem itself. Therefore, when a solution is offered, it is the wrong solution for the 
wrong problem. 
Another issue that is related to this phenomenon is a term called thin slicing.  Thin 
slicing is a method to make decisions quickly in times of crisis.  Thin slicing is a 
technique that resides in the military and first-responder culture, where fireman, police, 
and soldiers, will make split decisions based on a sixth sense which is developed after 
years of exposure to life threatening situations where certain sounds, smells, or images 
prompt a person to decide or act quickly to save lives or thwart disaster.63  Though this is 
a crucial skill for first responders, it could prove disastrous in the defense planning sector, 
as procuring capabilities requires methodical and careful planning where programs are 
funded over three, five year defense programs. 
What is ironic about the defense culture is that the key decision-makers 
concerning capability procurement are flag officers who are typically force application 
operators who have developed the thin slicing technique in combat and major combat 
operations over years of military service.  This would imply that these decision makers 
might be predisposed to thin slicing and come to the table ready to make split or gut 
reactions without following a methodology or type of model. 
Perhaps this is why there is such opposition to defense planning processes that are 
steeped in rigor, such as CBP.  It is a process that is foreign to the tactical culture.  
                                                 
62 Forman, 5 
63 Malcolm Gladwell, Blink:  The Power of Thinking Without Thinking, New York, NY: Time Warner 
Book Company, 2005.  
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Though flag officers have years of strategic and operational experience, their formative 
years were spent at the tactical level, relying on their gut and acting quickly in times of 
stress and crisis. 
With regards to defense planning at USNORTHCOM, CBP has been adopted, but 
not fully embraced.  In addition to JCIDS, NORTHCOM has developed a process called 
the Capabilities Review and Resource Assessment (CRRA).  This is not to be associated 
with the CRRA used by the Air Force, which is the Capability Risk and Review 
Assessment.  NORTHCOM’s CRRA is conducted by J81 and is consistent with the 
JCIDS process.  Though NORTHCOM is working to institute their version of the CRAA, 
capability decisions are still sometimes conducted using the BOGSAT method.  This is 
not a problem unique to NORTHCOM.  CBP is a new discipline within the DoD and will 
take years to modify a culture that cut its teeth on Cold War programmatics. 
The same problems that perpetuate the BOGSAT at the senior decision making 
level is also felt at the action officer level of many staffs.  Unlike the flag officer, who has 
had years of operational and strategic level exposure, the action officer may have little, if 
any, strategic experience.  They come from the tactical arena where decisions are made 
quickly and they bring with them thin slicing skills that are razor sharp.  This is also true 
for Program Element Managers (PEMs).  PEMs think in terms of platforms and systems, 
not capabilities.  Moreover, PEMs live in a culture where defending platforms occurs at 
all costs.  The outcome of their fitness reports is directly proportional to the survival of 
their responsible system, not by the desired effect their systems provides to the combatant 
commander. 
Another irony that exists on many staffs is that the director was once a PEM when 
he or she was a new field grade officer reporting to their first assignment at the Pentagon 
or Joint Staff.  This makes for an interesting dynamic as staffs have essentially evolved, 
or are evolving, in a PEM culture.  This is where the double-edged sword emerges.  
Services must defend programs that are directly tied to their portion of the total 
obligation(al) authority of the defense budget, while justifying the necessity of these 
programs that should be tied to its capability which, in-turn, produces a desired effect. 
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B. THREAT-BASED PLANNING AND OTHER CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORKS 
One way the DoD attempted to overcome the culture of the BOGSAT was to 
adopt a method of defense planning called threat-based planning.  Threat-based planning 
provided utility during the Cold War when assessing the capability of a major adversary 
such as the Soviet Union.  This method of planning works well with a peer competitor via 
the lens of a bi-polar international system.  The bi-polar system provides a fair amount of 
stability to project threats and vulnerabilities for reasonably long periods of time.  This 
system perpetuates technological advances which inherently become part of national 
infrastructures that directly effect economies and defense budgets.  In reality, the Cold 
War and the era of threat-based planning ushered in a technological warfare culture 
where America deeply depended on technological advances to minimize vulnerabilities 
with the Soviets. 
In addition to discerning threat, this form of planning also focuses on 
vulnerabilities which are requisite to a quantitative method adopted by McNamara during 
the Vietnam period.  Threat-based planning also introduces scenarios as a way to provide 
context to overcome the vagueness associated with a pure numerical analysis.  This 
methodology becomes a push-pull relationship, gauging threat and vulnerability which 
will ultimately prompt a requirement to rectify the perceived vulnerability.  Requirements 
drive programs, which then drive production and procurement of hardware and systems.   
The key problem with this method of planning was that it is a reactive process, 
matching tit for tat with the Soviets as they introduced new weapons into their arsenal.  
New weapons implied a new, or more, vulnerability which prompted a requirement to 
resolve that vulnerability with a new weapon or platform to deliver it.  This phenomenon 
initiated the arms race which glutted America and Russia with enormous stock piles of 
troops and equipment providing, Americans with a false sense of national security.  What 
threat-based planning really failed to accomplish was to measure the likelihood or 
intentions of the Soviets.  This likelihood can be translated into risk, which this method 
of planning failed to determine.  This process has the ability to send a nation down the 
wrong rabbit hole, completely procuring the wrong systems to minimize risk. 
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Other frameworks have been utilized over the years in addition to threat-based 
Planning.  Some of these include:  Top-Down Planning, Bottom-up Planning, Scenario 
Based Planning, Hedging, Technology, Fiscal, and Core Competencies, Capabilities and 
Missions Planning.  Each has their strengths and weaknesses and collectively, have led to 
the evolvement of defense planning. 
Top-Down Planning focuses on America’s Grand and Defense Strategies and is 
very hierarchal by nature.  Its strength is that it helps planners think in terms of ends with 
an emphasis on supporting national power such as:  economic, political, and military 
relationships.  However, it is too overarching by nature and the details of capabilities are 
often lost or hard to match to national objectives.64 
Bottom-up Planning looks at improving existing capabilities with regards to 
current operational issues.  Its advantage is that it is focuses on real world issues and is 
easy to conceptualize.  Its shortfall is that it is nearsighted approach and fails to capture 
emerging threats and big picture issues.65 
Scenario Based Planning is situationally driven, grounded by specific crises or 
major conflict operations.  Like the bottom-up method, this planning is tangible and easy 
to conceptualize, often with clear priorities and objective defined.  The greatest pitfall of 
this model is that the scenarios are illustrative, not predictive, often relying on old crises 
or engagements.66 
Hedging is a method which focuses fully preparing or over preparing of any 
conceivable military tasking.  It is effective as it captures the detail required to negate a 
myriad of threats, but is unrealistic as it is the most costly method available.67 
Technology Planning, as the name implies, leverages technology to provide 
advantage over the adversary.  The atomic bomb, space assets, and precision guided  
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65 Ibid., 25. 
66 Ibid., 27. 
67 Ibid., 30. 
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munitions are examples of this type of planning.  While the advantages are obvious, its 
shortfall is it often neglects non-material solutions as a way to optimize tactics, 
techniques, and procedures.68 
The fiscal approach obviously uses the budget to drive this model.  In reality, 
every planning meeting at the Pentagon has its roots tied to this process.  While this 
process is effective for exercising fiscal discipline, it is difficult for this process to be tied 
to changes in threat or capability.  For example, if 25% was shaved from a particular 
program, this does not necessarily mean that 25% of the systems capability is lost.  
Further, this same 25% cut to a program does not translate into a 25% increase in threat. 
Finally, Core Competencies, Capabilities and Missions Planning is the newest 
predecessor to capabilities based planning.  It incorporates many of the processes of the 
before mentioned models with the added nuance of mission planning.  While this model 
is quite encompassing and realistic, it is too tactical in nature, focusing on the minutia of 
particular service missions, also missing the big picture of national strategy. 
It is apparent with the introduction of these various models, that defense planning 
is a challenging art and not necessarily a science.  These models led the way to 
capability-based planning, particularly the JCIDS process adopted by the DoD.  Each 
model introduced at the Pentagon brought with it the hope that the DoD was closer to a 
solution to better manage programs and risk.  It is also worthy to note that with each 
silver bullet introduced, a spirit of cynicism continued to grow amongst the senior civil 
servants who in disgust resorted back to their comfort zone, aka the BOGSAT, 
abandoning rigorized methodologies. 
Many contend that capability-based planning is nothing new, but merely a 
hodgepodge of failed models cobbled together to satisfy the findings of the 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).  Regardless, this new model has become the central 
theme of defense planning and is more than likely here to stay until the QDR deems an 
adequate replacement. 
                                                 
68 Henry C. Bartlett, G.Paul Holman, Jr. and Timothy E. Somes, The Art of Strategy and Force 
Planning, New Port, RI:  Naval War College Press, 2005, 24-25. 
33 
The DoD and services have adopted it and continue to refine its processes, while 
planners grapple with the intricacies of this paradigm know as capability-based planning.   
C. JCIDS 
As discussed in the previous and introduction sections of this thesis, JCIDS is the 
current model used by the DoD to capture capabilities strengths and gaps to help shape 
funding decisions for a wide variety disciplines or focus areas, such as: force protection, 
battlespace awareness, force application, focused logistics, command and control, and the 
network-centric environment.  These disciplines are encapsulated by what is known as a 
family of Joint Operations Concepts.  The following statement captures the intent of this 
design:  “In April 2003, the Secretary of Defense directed the development of the Joint 
Operations Concepts (JOpsC) family.  This family consists of a Capstone Concept for 
Joint Operations (CCJO), Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs), Joint Functional Concepts 
(JFCs), and Joint Integrating Concepts (JICs).  These concepts look beyond the FYDP 
out to 20 years.”69 
Each concept has its place in the CBP process and each concept is published in 
corresponding documents.  The following definitions and figure help delineate this family 
of documents: 
• CCJO - “Overarching concept of the JOpsC family that guides 
development of future joint force capabilities.  Broadly describes how the 
joint force is expected to operate in the mid to far term, reflects enduring 
national interests derived from strategic guidance, and identifies the key 
characteristics of the Future Joint Force.”70 
•  JOC - “Operational-level descriptions of how a Joint Force Commander 
will accomplish a strategic mission through the conduct of operational-
level military operations within a campaign.  Applies the CCJO solution 
and joint force characteristics to a more specific military problem.  
Identifies challenges, key ideas for solving those challenges, effects to be 
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generated to achieve objectives, essential capabilities likely needed to 
achieve objectives and the relevant conditions in which the capabilities 
must be applied.”71 
• JFC - “Describes how the Future Joint Force will perform a particular 
military function across the full ROMO.  JFCs apply the CCJO solution 
and joint force characteristics to the specific military problem.  They 
identify the required functional capabilities needed to generate the effects 
identified in JOCs and identify attributes needed to functionally support 
the Future Joint Force. JFCs address Tier 1 Level Joint Capability 
Areas.”72  
• JIC - “Describe how a Joint Force Commander will perform his 
operations or functions that are a subset of JOC and JFC capabilities.  JICs 
address Tier 2 Level or below Joint Capability Areas.  JICs have the 
narrowest focus of all Joint Future Concepts and describe capabilities and 
decompose them into task level detail.  An illustrative vignette is applied 
to the JIC to describe the environment in which these tasks will be 
performed.  The standard of performance for these tasks is described in a 
common taxonomy for concepts and capabilities.”73 
 
Figure 1.   JOpsC Family74                                                  
71 The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOpsC Family of Joint Concepts - Executive Summaries, 
23 August 2005, 6. 
72 Ibid., 11. 
73 Ibid., 20. 
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This family of documents thus becomes the reference materials for Capability-
Based Assessments (CBA) within the JCIDS process.  First it is important to understand 
what the CBA is.  CJCSI 3170.01F, states:  “The CBA is the JCIDS analysis process that 
includes three phases: the FAA [functional area analysis], the FNA [functional needs 
analysis], and the FSA [functional solutions analysis].”75 
The FAA defines the military problem, scopes the problem, introduces 
capabilities needed, and links those capabilities to defense strategy.  The FNA is the 
portion of the CBA that begins to discern gaps in capabilities.  Here capabilities are 
scored using the context of the scenario in the FAA.  The FSA, as the name implies, is 
the process which recommends solutions to capability gaps ascertained in the FNA.  
These solutions are often broad and overarching, identifying both material and non-
materials solutions to rectify the gaps. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, analysis of the Net-Centric Environment 
JFC and JIC will be conducted as the JFC and JIC contain the specified parameters to 
conduct the CBA such, as: the scenario or vignette and the capabilities and attributes to 
be scored during the assessment to determine gaps or excess.  The following figure helps 
visualize this complex process: 
 
Figure 2.   The JCIDS Analysis Process76                                                  
75 The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capabilities-Based Assessment User’s Guide, December 
2006, 4. 
















V. IDENTIFYING COMMUNICATION SHORTFALLS FOR 
USNORTHCOM 
A. CURRENT METHODOLOGY 
NORTHCOM has adopted a derivative of JCIDS called the CRAA.  This CRRA 
is not be confused with the Air Force CRRA, but is essentially JCIDS coupled with an 
Interagency Coordination (IC) component to facilitate their mission of providing defense 
support for civil authorities.  This IC component allows collaboration with interagency 
partners which, in-turn, provides input for their CRRA process. 
The CRRA is conducted annually by the J5 and J8, with J8 acting as office of 
primary responsibility for the overall codification process.  The CRRA work in concert 
with the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution cycle, to support NORAD and 
NORTHCOM’s commitment to fulfill national military strategy.  This methodology is 
used to help identify current and future capabilities and help guide the command’s 
investment decisions.  The output of this process is presented to the Office of Secretary of 
Defense, other defense agencies, the Joint Staff, the services, and to the Canadian 
department of National Defense to inform this community on capability development, 
acquisition, sustainment, and investment needs.77 
Guidance for the CRRA process is contained in NORAD/USNORTHCOM 
Instruction 90-144 and is compliant with the following DoD and Joint 
instructions/processes: 
• CJCS Instruction 3170.01E, JCIDS 
• CJCS Instruction 6212.01D, Interoperability and Supportability of 
Information Technology and National Security Systems  
• DoD Directive 5000.1, the Defense Acquisition System 
• DoD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System 
• DoD Directive 7045.7, Implementation of the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting System 
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As the CRRA is a new process, it is more of a vision than a reality.  This is the 
first time the CRRA has been conducted and, as with any new concept, it is just 
beginning to make traction.  NORTHCOM is the newest combatant command and is 
barely getting its arms around JCIDS, let alone its recent cousin, the CRRA.  Though it 
offers promise, particularly regarding its interagency collaboration piece, it will have to 
survive cultural barriers and the plethora of taskings that seem to plague higher 
headquarters organizations. 
As for determining communications shortfalls for homeland defense, the J6 has 
yet to adopt the CRRA.  Currently, they are utilizing the JCIDS process, primarily 
focusing on the NCE JFC and JIC as the instruments to conduct their analysis.  Though 
this directorate is valiant in pursuing this process, the NCE JFC and JIC are laden with 
their own unique set of problems which impede the NCE planning process in the context 
of homeland defense and security. 
This leads to the most important aspect of capability-based planning: the context 
in which one discerns capability gaps.  The context is based on the scenario that is at the 
front end of the model.  This is the lens that helps the planners and subject matter experts 
determine what environment they are to operate within.  In the case of JCIDS or 
NORTHCOM’s CRRA, this scenario is contained in the JFC.  The scenario contained in 
the NCE JFC is a vignette occurring in Turkey, involving the capital city which is struck 
by an 8.2 magnitude earthquake, displacing thousands of Turkish citizens and destroying 
or disrupting Turkey’s critical infrastructure.78  While this type of vignette is likely to 
occur, much like how Hurricane Katrina transpired, it is only a single event.  Though it is 
an adequate starting point, NORTHCOM will surely be faced with multiple events that 
will exceed the intensity of a natural disaster. 
More appropriately, the NCE JFC should contain a series of events that would 
reside in NORTHCOM’s purview.  More precisely, multiple events in the homeland and 
abroad are more realistic.  Events such as a dirty bomb detonation in the port of Long 
Beach, followed by a Tsunami in Australia, topped off by a string of IEDs in downtown 
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Manhattan during rush hour.  The diversity and intensity of these simultaneous events 
would provide the adequate stress in the model to keep SMEs and planners attentive. 
B. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CURRENT PROCESSES 
In the previous section, a key weakness was identified that now begins to clear the 
path for what is right and what is wrong with NORTHCOM’s model.  Starting with its 
strengths was the fact that the J8 Directorate realized JCIDS was a not one-size fits all 
model.  Their initiative to establish the CRRA is evidence that the command is serious 
about solving interagency NCE shortfalls.  Establishing the IC component of the CRRA 
is a very pragmatic solution to enable collaboration with non-DoD partners.  While this is 
often a painful pursuit of clashing cultures, it will pay dividends when capturing the right 
expertise and perspectives when pinned together during reoccurring forums.  Eventually, 
these forums will condition themselves to overcome these cultural barriers, ultimately 
developing the right network of planners to solve interoperability problems.79 
Further, the CRRA provides NORTHCOM with a quantitative assessment of end-
to-end look at capabilities, addressing desired effects.  It attempts to link strategy to 
capabilities and then, to desired effects.  This process is the catalyst to evolve from the 
BOGSAT which still resides at NORTHCOM and other higher headquarter institutions.80 
While the J8 is working hard to institutionalize a capability-based model that 
works for the command, several weaknesses are inherent in the process.  These 
weaknesses apply to both the JCIDS and CRRA models adopted by NORTHCOM.  This 
implies that NORTHCOM is not solely in error, but that the Joint Staff has created a 
model that is too complex and labor intensive.  In an effort to design an encompassing 
process, it is has become over engineered and far too difficult to comprehend.  Too many 
working parts reside in the process and it requires months, if not years to master.  Over 
500 pages of esoteric guidance must be consumed before a participant is to gain an 
elementary working knowledge of the NCE portion of JCIDS. 
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Action officers assigned to labor in this discipline lack the continuity to gain in 
depth expertise.  Often, action officers change assignments several times within their 
tours, barely scratching the surface, then moving on to new duties.  Even if the directorate 
is staffed with an action officer who can provide continuity, the SMEs tasked to provide 
the analysis have to be trained or retrained to perform their duties, often in a very narrow 
time slot.  What exacerbates this problem further is the fact that few action officers are 
dedicated solely to the JCIDS or CRRA process.  They are encumbered with multiple 
taskings unrelated to capability-based planning, that clouds their ability to focus and 
spend the adequate time necessary to develop the proper methodology and analysis to 
garner NCE gaps. 
The same problems experienced by the action officers responsible to administer 
these processes also pertain to the SMEs who are tasked to perform the scoring and 
analysis of the JFCs and JICs.  Few, if any, headquarters possess the sufficient number of 
SMEs organically to analyze the diversity and complexity of the NCE JFC and JIC.  
Thus, headquarters must solicit help throughout the services to find the right mixture of 
expertise to conduct the appropriate level of analysis needed.  Hence, the problems of 
over tasking and lack of continuity permeates into this body, where understanding and 
ample time to dedicate to the process is absent.  This ultimately affects the control group 
used, as the base of action officers and SMEs are so dynamic that perceptions, expertise, 
and interest drive different scores and outcomes from year to year.  Just finding and 
maintaining a usable repository of SME who are willing in able to participate in the 
planning process, is a full time responsibility. 
In addition to personnel issues that affect the control group, the ability to quantify 
the criterion of the NCE standards and measures of the JIC is problematic.  This criterion 
is too specific to be scored in any given scenario.  For example, if response time to 
provide connection to US and non-US networks is the standard being measured and the 
criteria is 30-60 seconds, how can that be measured?  Does someone have a stop watch to 
monitor every connection in every work center?  Of course not.  Thus this criterion loses 
its utility and SMEs typically respond with something like, ‘it depends.’81 
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 Further, the amount of capabilities, tasks, and standards contained in the JIC are 
too great and require far too much time to analyze.  Many of these can be eliminated to 
simplify and expedite the process.  Most organizations lack the luxury for their action 
officers to dedicate this much effort in a supporting role.  
C. AN OPTIMZIED PROPOSAL82 
In an attempt to elevate the problems associated with the JCIDS model, this thesis 
offers a more intuitive and simplified capability-based model.  The model offered here is 
an overview of a hybrid of several planning models, not an all encompassing proposal, 
but contains sufficient detail to articulate its utility.  For the purposes of this model the 
following critical elements must be covered:  the Scenario, the Master Capabilities 
Library (MCL), SME Selection, and the Forum. 
The Scenario 
The scenario is the first lens to look through and the most important.  The 
scenario is the event or events which provides context or sets the stage of the operation.  
It provides the who, what, when, where, and why of the operation.  For example, if the 
military is engaged in operations with civil authorities, such as evacuation efforts due to 
natural disaster or a CBRNE event, the scenario helps provide the operational 
environment or situation in which personnel and equipment operate.  This is critical as it 
helps planners visualize what stressors affect the operation.   
For the intent of this model, it is important to select a scenario that is most 
stressing.  This ensures planners select the right capabilities to be evaluated or applied to 
the event.  The Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) has been tasked to identify the most 
stressing scenarios to our nation and military.  Two Major Conflict Operations (MCOs) 
are applied, plus four vignettes should be applied to the methodology.83  Vignettes are 
CBRNE and natural disaster events and thus are perfectly matched for first-responder 
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operations.  Further, a CBRNE event would be the most stressing to civil authority and 
first-responder communication systems, as it is a worst case scenario which could occur 
to our country.  Communications systems would have to be survivable to electro 
magnetic pulse, interoperable with military, federal, state, and local agencies.  This does 
not imply that capabilities must be gold plated, but acts as a reminder of the severe 
environment present for planners and SME to keep in the back of their minds when 
conducting analysis.  In order to facilitate this, a scripted briefing containing the details of 
the scenario and its vignettes must be crafted and presented to the entire body conducting 
the analysis at the initial stage of the process.  Also, it should remain present during the 
duration of the planning session and be cited in the published findings of the analysis.  
This assists planners and SME from reverting to previous real world events or lessons 
learned which not the intent of this type of analysis.   
The intent of this model is to capture current and future capability shortfalls for 
current plus two FYDPs, thus aligning itself with the POM of the services supporting 
NORTHCOM.  If documented correctly, this provides extremely important justification 
to programmers to defend their systems that fill the shortfall gap.  However, this must be 
validated by participants from the Joint Staff, NORHCOM, and the services. 
The MCL 
The MCL is a repository of capabilities, not tasks.  The MCL consists of five 
distinct parts:  the category, the domain, the capability, the attribute, and the Measure of 
Performance (MOP).  It is the primary tools for SMEs to score the maturity of 
capabilities 
The category, Provide the Network-Centric Environment, is a modified definition 
from the NCE JFC which is more applicable for HLD operations.  It should read: 
Connectivity and interoperability that allows all DoD users and mission partners to 
include: Joint, Coalition, Inter-Agency, Federal, State, and Local First Responder users to 
share information when they need it in a form they can understand and act on it with 
confidence, and protects information from those who should not have it.   
The domain is the environment personnel and equipment operates in, such as:  
land, sea, air, and space. The domains are defined in the following manner. 
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• Land – Operations where personnel and equipment reside on the ground, 
such as:  search and rescue operations, police and fire operations, 
Command and Control (C2), Nuclear C2 (NC3), and Special Operations 
(SOF) missions. 
• Sea – Operations where personnel and equipment reside on the water, 
ocean, lake, and river, such as:  port security, search and rescue, counter 
sea operations, and NC3. 
• Air – Operations where personnel and equipment reside in the air, such as:  
air strike, C2, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and, 
NC3. 
• Space - Provide services/connectivity to and from assets used in 
operations that occur in space, such as:  space situational awareness, 
offensive counter space, defensive counter space, missile warning, 
surveillance, communications, precision navigation and timing, nuclear 
command and control, and weather. 
As previously mentioned, the capability is what service is being delivered, not the 
system or the solution.  Therefore NCE capabilities in its simplest form are:  provide 
voice, video, or data services.  Capabilities are defined in the following manner: 
• Voice – Information, such as: radio, phone, interphone, voice over Internet 
Protocol, or public address system. 
• Video – Information, such as: streaming video, video teleconferencing, 
live transmissions, or recorded video. 
• Data – Information, such as:  text or imagery, such as: digitized photos, 
forms, publications, email, messages, web pages, chat sessions, or audio 
files. 
Attributes are the characteristics of the capability which gives it uniqueness or 
desired level of performance.  These attributes are defined in the following manner: 
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• Timely - Expected timeliness to meet mission requirements.  Implies 
latency, speed, and responsiveness of systems and information in all 
environments. 
• Availability - Information access, anytime/anywhere.  Implies adequate 
bandwidth, redundancy and self-healing/self-forming architecture.  
Includes Machine to Machine (M2M) interconnectivity.   
• Survivable - Expected to survive in multi-environments: electro-magnetic 
pulse, directed energy attack, and radio frequency attack.  Implies the 
capability is hardened to withstand physical attack. 
• Low Probability of Intercept/Low Probability of Detect - Ability to 
provide low probability of intercept and detect.  Implies ability to operate 
in anti-access environments where low observable and stealth are required 
towards mission success. 
• Protected - Information is expected to withstand information attack or 
compromise from an adversary. Includes information assurance attributes, 
such as: authenticity and non-repudiation.  Further implies multi-level 
security capabilities to appropriately share information with coalition, 
DoD, inter-agency, federal, state, and local partners. 
• Useable - Ability to operate the system with little or no effort or training.  
Implies the system is intuitive to operate and the output is decision quality, 
discernable, and easy to comprehend.  Further implies the appropriate 
human factor analysis has occurred to ensure ease of operation and 
comprehension of information flow.   
The final component of the MCL is the MOP.  The MOP is the value function that 
is scored by operators, planners, and technical experts to assess the respective capability 
and its attribute.  The process consists of two parts: establishing the value function and 
assessing the capability and attribute.  Establishing the value function is accomplished 
first.  This is where the operator expresses the required level of performance and what 
attribute is essential for mission success. Then, NCE planners and Subject Matter Experts 
45 
(SME) will assess and score to determine if existing capabilities meet the value function.  
If not, then a potential capability gap is discerned and recorded for further analysis and 
validation. 
Four categories are assigned to the value function:  No Military Value (NMV), 
Limited Military Value (LMV), Good Enough (GE), and More Doesn’t Matter (MDM).  
The critical step is establishing the GE value, as GE is the goal to discerning if 
appropriate capability exists.  Anything less implies a capability shortfall, while anything 
more implies excess and the capability does nothing more to enhance the mission.  This is 
accomplished in a collaborative effort with planners and operators looking through the 
scenario lens and judging what capabilities are needed, what corresponding attribute is 
essential, and what MOP is necessary to accomplish the mission. 
The following table illustrates the useable attribute: 
 
Useable 1. Unable:  NMV:  1-10 
2. Extreme Difficulty:  NMV:  11-20 
3. Considerable difficulty:  LMV  21-40 
4. With Some Effort:  LMV:  41-79 
5. With Minimal Effort:  GE:  80 
Ability to operate the system with little or no effort or 
training.  Implies the system is intuitive to operate and 
the output is decision quality, discernable, and easy to 
comprehend.  Further implies the appropriate human 
factor analysis has occurred to ensure ease of 
operation and comprehension of information flow.   6. Completely Intuitive:  MDM:  81-100 
Table 2.   Attribute and MOP Depiction 
 
For example, if an operator needed data services in the land domain, useable 
would be a relevant attribute.  Now, at what level does useable become necessary to 
accomplish the mission?  What threshold can the operator live with where more really 
does not matter to complete the mission?  If completely intuitive provides no advantage 
over minimal effort, then the value function becomes 5- with minimal effort. 
Once the value function has been set, now the planner and SME can assess to 
determine what systems and platforms provide this type of capability and perform at the 
level.  If not, then a potential capability shortfall may exist. 
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To illustrate this collective process, consider if Monterey was responding to an 
earthquake.  The earthquake would become the scenario or vignette and would contain 
certain stressors such as, no electrical power, buildings destroyed, fire, and etc.  The first 
responder or fireman would have to determine what communication/NCE capability is 
needed to accomplish their mission.  They decide handheld radios are necessary and 
useable is a required attribute.  They further determine that the GE value is 5, useable 
with minimal effort.  Now the SME and planner can assess their current radios to 
determine if it meets that value.  If not, a possible shortfall exists and then they begin the 
validation process to discern if shortfalls exist and begin to package the data in a decision 
quality format.  Once the data is validated and formatted, planners present the data to 
decision makers, who prioritize funding requirements for annual procurement budget 
decisions.  This process provides an objective and quantitative approach.  
SME Selection  
 Another critical element of this model is the selection of subject matter experts.  
As described in the MCL portion of this thesis, the MOP is a two sided equation, 
analyzed by two types of SMEs.  The operational SME is an expert well-versed in a 
particular operation contained in the scenario.  For the purposes of the HLD vignette 
discussed earlier where Monterey suffered from an earthquake, fireman, police, and 
military assisting in the disaster would quantify what is needed to establish the value 
function.  Further, interagency partners, such as FEMA, DHS, and the Red Cross, must 
be present to state their needs.  These groups of experts capture the communication 
requirements pertaining to that scenario. 
 The second set of SMEs is known as system experts well versed in capabilities 
these systems deliver.  Typically these are programmers, engineers, and acquisition 
specialists who intimately know the characteristics of NCE equipment.  These SMEs can 
match the capability of these systems to the value function set by the operational SMEs.  
Though the capability-based model is to be system agnostic, eventually matching must 




before the horse issue typically occurring in non-capability models, as the operator is 
present during the duration of the analysis, acting as an honest broker, constantly 
articulating operational need. 
 SME selection is often viewed as a lesser important duty of the process, but it 
requires meticulous record keeping to ensure SMEs are available and possess current and 
relevant knowledge.  This requires reoccurring dialog between NORTHCOM, the SMEs, 
and their leadership to foster this network of personnel between planning cycles.  This 
helps alleviate the cultural barriers in interagency forums, merely by conducting open and 
reoccurring chats to champion collective issues.  This investment in social capital 
requires no formal design or procurement boards to establish.  It is a simple exercise 
where leaders, SMEs, and planners pick up the phone or send an email to maintain 
contact and collectively work towards solving problems. 
The Forum 
 An additional  element of this process often overlooked is the type of forum used 
to capture perspective shortfalls.  The JCIDS process is too formal and complex to 
facilitate a large interagency body.  Often data calls are sent out beyond the confines of 
the headquarters without much facilitation, where SMEs and action officers remotely fill 
in spreadsheets within the walls of their cubicles.  Hence a balance must occur where the 
forum is not too formal to stifle problem solving, but not too relaxed an atmosphere as 
the ad hock BOGSAT. 
 Initially, NORTHCOM should host the forum at their headquarters with a good 
facilitator to guide the process.  Anything over a week in duration typically lacks 
productivity, as it will exceed human attention and interest span.  The forum must be 
conducted in a true interagency fashion, with the right mixture of SMEs present from the 
respective agencies anticipated to participate in the given HLD/HLS scenario.  The 
introductory session should include leadership from these agencies to champion the 
process and elicit support for it.  After a few gatherings have been hosted at 
NORTHCOM, the forum could be rotated and hosted by one of the other interagency 
groups, further improving relationships and lowering cultural barriers. 
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 The forum should be recorded to ensure the important sound bites have been 
captured and can be included in the findings of the planning session.  Once the planning 
session is concluded by SMEs and planners, the packaged findings should be validated by 
the leadership of these various agencies.  Again, this should be conducted in a 
collaborative setting, where collective buy in and consensus is achieved. 
 This could serve as a seamless interagency planning process, where these senior 
leaders would present their findings to the house and senate in a true collaborative 
manner.  Obviously it is absurd to assume 100 percent agreement amongst these diverse 




































A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As this thesis concludes, it must now readdress the initial research question:  Does 
CBP possess the right methodology to assist defense planners and programmers in 
determining capability gaps/shortfalls?  To assist in ascertaining this, the following sub-
questions must be answered: 
• How can the CBP process be more intuitive? 
The obvious solution to this problem is to consider the audience who will review 
the data.  In this application, the audience will be at the flag officer and senior executive 
service rank.  This implies that the time constraints of this group are precious and the 
process must be immediately understood to garner their buy-in.  Analytical rigor is 
important, but not to the extent that a primer in network or engineering fundamentals is 
necessary to understand the results. 
This is why a graduated scale of 1-5 is recommended to measure the performance 
of the attributes in the network-centric master capabilities list.  Measuring availability in 
megabits per second versus available when needed has very little meaning to a career 
fighter pilot or infantryman.  As operational experts will determine the value function, or 
the good enough value, of the model, it must be expressed in consumer terms.  For 
example, when a consumer is purchasing a high speed internet connection for their home 
or office, few consumers know they need a connection speed of 1.5 megabits per second.  
However, they realize the need for a connection that is available when needed, reliable, 
and responsive. 
Further, the overall CBP model must not contain too many moving parts.  The 
current JCIDS model involves three distinct phases: the functional area analysis, the 
functional needs analysis, and the function solutions analysis.  These are conducted in a 
stove pipe fashion; coupled with the ambiguity of the JFC and JIC, it makes for a far too 
complex model.  Therefore, the design must be seamless and conducted in the same 
forum by the same SMEs to the greatest extent possible. 
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• How does CBP determine capability gaps? 
The capability-based model is a hybrid of past and existing defense planning 
models that have evolved over time.  It integrates components of the scenario-based 
planning, hedging, technology, fiscal, core competencies, capabilities and missions 
planning, and threat-based models discussed in Chapter IV of this thesis.  Therefore, if 
constructed and conducted properly, the CBP model offers the most innovative and 
exhaustive approach. 
The ultimate advantage of capability-based planning is that it minimizes the 
BOGSAT phenomenon that resides in most military headquarters.  CBP offers a model 
that has been vetted and scored by SMEs across many different disciplines from many 
different organizations.  It reduces making decisions in a vacuum and eliminates the 
emotional factor of funding pet rock programs.  It is a process steeped in capabilities, not 
tasks or systems, which produce a quantifiable correlation to the shortfall, regardless if 
using a capability library or JIC for scoring. 
The use of the scenario as the initial lens provides context, which is the most 
important phase of this planning process.  It offers situational vignettes which provide 
flexibility when forecasting threat or adversary capability in current and out year 
planning cycles.  It helps operators dial in their requirements and articulate specific 
capability needs. 
The establishing of value functions set by the operator helps determine the good 
enough unit of measure in order to accomplish mission requirements.  This helps 
eliminate gold plating that engineers tend to be fond of as they fall in love with their 
respective designs and systems.  This should help restrain cost overruns and identify 
duplicate capabilities or areas that do not provide military value or utility. 
What is useful regarding the proposed methodology, specifically addressing the 
master capability library, is in utilizing the four domains, i.e. air, land, sea, and space.  
This will call on experts from all branches of the service and interagency partners from 
the coast Guard, NRO, NSA, and NGA.  This model will aid in the facilitating of joint 
and interagency collaboration and dialog. 
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• How does the output of CBP provide meaningful data for decision makers 
to prioritize procurement funds?  What is this data? 
CBP offers data that connects the dots between operator requirements, existing 
system capability, and what systems can bridge the shortfall gaps.  It can aid in 
championing the utility of a system or it can provide quantifiable data that may justify 
program cancellation.  For example, if a particular radio system is being developed and 
programmed, but it cannot be tied to an existing capability or future capability gap, 
decision makers should question its utility and may desire to divert funds to programs 
that indeed can be traced to urgent capability needs. 
Regarding the data types that may be useful to decision makers, this is dependent 
again on the audience or background of the principals making fiscal decisions.  Typically, 
operators prefer a variation of a stoplight chart that appeals to their thin slicing culture.  
The following chart could act as template for output data for decision makers. 
NCE for HLD/HLS (Air Domain)
ProvideText or imagery such as: digitized photos, forms/publications, email, 
messages, web pages, chat sessions, or audio files.
3.1.3. Provide Data Services for 
the Air Domain
Provide Information such as: streaming video, VTC, live transmissions, or 
recorded video
3.1.2. Provide Video Services for 
the Air Domain
Provide Information via voice to include radio, phone, interphone, voice over IP, 
or public address system
3.1.1. Provide Voice Services for 
the Air Domain
Provide services/connectivity to and from assets used in Operations that occur 
in air to air, air to ground, and ground to air.
3.1. Provide the NCE for the Air 
Domain
Rational: FEMA SMEs identified data sharing limitations between police, fire
and military personnel during interagency operations for a CBRNE event in the
homeland.
COA/OPR: SAF/XC and NSA continue MLS guard development to provide data
sharing access to state and local first responders.
PE: 15XXX, MLS Guards
 




• How can CBP be improved to better determine communication shortfalls? 
In addition to making the model and process more intuitive across a wide body of 
operator and system SMEs, the measures of performance must be quantifiable and the 
justification of the score must be captured.  Eliminating the complexity of the process, i.e. 
migrating to an MCL versus the JFC and JIC, would expedite the data collection 
processes considerable.  It is well understood that planners desire a comprehensive model 
to ensure no stone is un-turned.  However, the over engineering of the JCIDS process 
produces too much overhead and time spent to complete the planning process.  In times 
of crisis, where SMEs are dragged out of their operational environment to participate in 
the CBP process, time and talent management is critical.  Thus, a balance must be 
achieved to provide a reasonably feasible methodology that eliminates the ambiguity and 
time restraints associated with JCIDS. 
This leads the discussion back to the overarching question of this thesis, which is:  
Does CBP possess the right methodology for defense planners and programmers in 
determining capability gaps/shortfalls?  The emphatic answer is, if JCIDS is the approach 
used, no.  JCIDs must be transformed to a simpler and more intuitive process.  However, 
regardless of the methodology adopted, failure to conduct the planning session in an 
interagency environment will continue to provide myopic outcomes, with stovepipe 
solutions feebly provided to fill these gaps. 
This research problem is inherently an interagency problem.  Therefore, the 
problem solving must occur in an interagency environment.  Defense planning cannot 
continue to function in a vacuum.  Cultural barriers must be leveled and this may be best 
motivated by controlling the purse strings.  Interoperability standards should be designed 
into the planning, programming, and acquisition process.  Interoperable engineering 
standards can then be validated before programs progress, ultimately being coordinated 
before an interagency working group. 
This working group could participate in House and Senate appropriations 
committees to ensure the collective need is articulated and championed.  Realistically 
then, for the culture to change via the stick of controlling the purse strings, congressional 
directives and oversight must occur to facilitate this change.  Perhaps a derivative of the 
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Nichols/Goldwater Act might be the instrument to force reform of the defense planning 
process.  This initiative might eventually change the course of this bureaucratic and 
inefficient discipline. 
In addition to legislative measures, a heightened awareness of the capability-
based planning process must propagate within the DoD and its interagency partners.  This 
may be facilitated by incorporating a training module in existing curriculums for action 
officers prior to starting their staff assignment.  Further, reoccurring training could 
include a module of refresher training that could be implemented as an annual 
requirement.  Familiarity training should also be made available to SMEs upon their 
selection to participate in a CBP forum.  This could be a web-based module completed 
prior to their participation in a CBP forum. 
Perhaps more effective than familiarity training is a certification course, much 
like that which is encouraged for the acquisition community.  This could act as an 
incentive for career planners and programmers to enhance their marketability and 
promotion opportunities.   Further emphasis should be introduced into professional 
military education environments, such as:  command staff and war colleges and civilian 
fellowship education programs.  
One final recommendation of the overall CBP process would be to focus on non-
material solutions to fill capability gaps.  Though it is implied, too much emphasis is 
placed on matching systems to fill these gaps.  Ample time must be spent on the entire 
DOTMLPF spectrum as a way to fill capability gaps.  The obvious reason of why this 
fails to occur is that non-material solutions are less glamorous.  Frankly, material 
solutions produce the most revenue and are more tangible to discuss and plan for.  
Optimizing business practices, which are normally tied to non-material solutions, should 
be the first area of house cleaning.  However, in times of extraordinarily lucrative defense 
contracts, non-material solutions lose their luster.  
B. WHO NEEDS IT? 
Since capabilities are ultimately tied to programs and fiscal expenditures, CBP 
has its tentacles embedded into many organizations within the DoD.  Currently the 
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acquisition community, J5 and J8 embraces CBP, but other organizations have been slow 
to follow suit.  Regarding communication and NCE gap analysis, J6 directorates across 
the DoD would benefit greatly if all were on the same sheet of music to adopt a 
standardized methodology.  It is also imperative that these three directorates establish a 
more cohesive environment during the planning process.  It is always disenchanting to 
discover that so few action officers have coordinated on NCE gap analysis across a 
headquarters organization.  Every Power Point slide or talking paper must be 
reintroduced and explained ad nauseum for it to move up the bureaucratic ladder. 
Ironically, it is the financial management and comptroller community which understands 
CBP the least.  While they are well versed at moving different pots of money around 
within the TOA, they seem less concerned about how the fiscal decision was reached to 
do so.   
Ultimately, the entire J staff should be in lock step regarding CBP.  Since NCE is 
such an enabling capability, every directorate is touched by its capability.  Though the J5, 
J6, and J8 are the directorates responsible for conducting the process, the J1, J2, J3, and 
J4 are the primary stake holders and ultimate recipients of NCE capabilities. 
In addition to headquarter organizations, center and agencies within the DoD 
could benefit greatly from the CBP model.  First and foremost would be DISA.  As DISA 
is DoD’s executive agent for communications and NCE, DISA may provide SME support 
and senior leader oversight.  The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is another 
obvious choice of an organization that could gain from the CBP experience.  As 
dissemination of intelligence information obtained from the various space and sensor 
platforms, the NRO is critical to the defense of the nation and their participation and 
advocacy in the CBP process is key.  Ideally, NORTHCOM, DISA, the NRO, and DHS 
could form the nucleus to champion communication shortfall analysis for homeland 
defense.  This collaborative model could be optimized over time, eliminating barriers and 
fostering effective relationships to solve this interagency problem. 
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